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                      How postcolonial is post-communist translation? 
 
 
       The expressions that have been used in relation to events in Eastern Europe after 
1989 are noticeably opaque. Revolution is usually described as velvet, the Soviet Union 
and the Berlin Wall are  collapsed, the societies and economies of Eastern Europe are in 
transition while regional nationalisms are commonly described as re-emerging. The 
vagueness of these and many other expressions about Eastern Europe implies that an 
adequate conceptual framework for the changes which have occurred in Eastern Europe 
is yet to be worked out. Political scientists, utterly unprepared for the change, have tried 
to disguise the inadequacy of their theories in relation to the past and present by working 
out new models of the post - Cold War political order . Since 1989 we have had as many 
as three major theories: “the end of history”, “ culture wars”, and the total 
“globalization”. Samuel Huntington’s essay  ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ written in 1993 
has become particularly popular, because the author offered a simple definition of the 
world order based on the principle of an inevitable conflict between, what he called “non-
West” and the West. Unfortunately, apart from generating a good deal of publicity, these 
models have not provided us with many new insights. What has been conspicuously 
missing from the discussion of the end of the Soviet empire is a comparison of the 
situation in the East with the disintegration of  other empires in the past. 
       This absence has been due to the fact, that unlike the empires built by the Western 
powers, the decomposition of the Soviet empire has been relatively peaceful, with the 
wars in Yugoslavia and the conflicts in the Caucasus being exceptions rather than the 
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rule. But this would be a very superficial view. One suspects there are deeper reasons, 
which emerge from the contrast between discourses relating to the old empires and the 
communist world. In the decades following the World War II, the collapse of colonial 
domination in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific region was greeted in Europe with optimistic  
enthusiasm. The terms employed for the change were positive. Guerrillas were called 
“freedom fighters”, “liberation movements”  and  the “resistance”. The word nationalism, 
if  used at all, had a positive meaning, and the newly established states were greeted with 
considerable optimism. Dictators were called “new leaders”, and the term 
“decolonization” was applied both to Idi Amin’s misrule in Uganda, and Fidel Castro’s 
ideological  excesses in Cuba. The more recent developments in Eastern Europe were 
received with far less unconditional enthusiasm. In fact, anxieties were voiced even while 
the Berlin Wall was coming down. Many German intellectuals, including such 
distinguished writers as Gunter Grass and Christa Wolff, were keen to prolong the 
existence of East Germany as an independent state far beyond what the Soviets 
envisaged. The independence of the Baltic republics was seen by many as a dangerous 
development at the doorstep of the Soviet Union. On the whole, in contrast to the 
disintegration of European dominions in Africa in the 1960s, the separatist and 
nationalistic tendencies in the Soviet sphere of influence were considered more as a 
threat to stability than a passage to freedom. In the European context the notion of 
nationalism was not coupled with “liberation” but with ethnic conflict, anti-Semitism, 
and civil war. 
     The fact that  similar postcolonial phenomena elicited quite different public responses  
was not accidental. The complex relations between the Western world and the Soviet 
Union over decades have led to a polarization of public opinion on the issue of 
communist domination in Eastern Europe. Until  recently, it was unusual to see the 
Soviet Union described as an imperialist power, and the phrase “the evil empire” which 
                                                                                                                      3 
 
president Reagan coined in the 1980s was considered a gross exaggeration in the West. 
For decades  colonial and postcolonial discourse developed with scanty regard for what 
was happening in the East, and thus, at present, when  Russians themselves are defining 
the Soviet Union as a colonial power, many specialists in the field of postcolonial theory 
still find it difficult to adjust their perspective. There is no doubt that this difficulty is of a 
political nature. From the outset, postcolonial  criticism has been the domain of 
politically committed critics, and although many of them seem  less committed than they 
used to be, they have been slow to admit that perhaps the Soviet Union, with its hundred 
nations speaking over a hundred languages, yet ruled by one political party, may also 
have deserved the name of empire - even if in its early days it chose the more edifying 
name of union. 
     But politics is not the only factor which has prevented postcolonial studies from 
turning its eye towards the former Soviet Union. The other important factor is the 
immense complexity of  colonial relations in Eastern Europe. Although the Soviet Union 
presented itself as the antithesis of  Zarist Russia, its colonial expansion was a clear 
continuation of  zarist policy, the difference being that after the October Revolution,  the 
old Russian imperialism steeped in Byzantine and Slavophile traditions was replaced 
with  Marxist dialectics and social determinism.  Extending an historical perspective over 
the last seventy years makes the East European case even more complicated, since up to 
the end of the World War I , the Russian Empire had rivals  competing for the same 
territories: Austro-Hungary, Prussia, and the Ottoman Empire in Europe, and China and 
Japan in Asia. Compared to Russia and the Soviet Union, the histories of  French, British, 
or Spanish domination look relatively simple. Western empires succeeded in conquering 
and dominating overseas territories because, apart from military force, they used their 
economic, social, and technological advantages to extend their influence overseas. 
Equally unproblematic is the Western allocation of guilt and responsibility for the 
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colonial past.  The history of the Western empires is usually presented as the crusade of 
the rich and cruel North against the poorer and weaker South. A straight line can be 
traced from the age of slave ships to the Vietnam war.  
     The news from the East does not permit  such clear configuration. Russia’s 
domination was a result of  military and political manipulation.  The empire grew slowly 
but steadily, and the conquerors developed a vast range of techniques to subjugate the 
newly defeated nations, which in many  cases were economically and socially more 
advanced than the conquering power. As a result the empire had to set up a much more 
complicated system of oppression in order to control subordinated populations than the 
one associated with Western European imperialism. A detailed analysis of the Russian 
and Soviet domination reveals yet another truth which postcolonial studies have not paid 
much attention to, namely, the unheroic story of collaboration,1 and the issue of 
ideological propaganda. As a result, the de-colonization of the space between 
Vladivostok and the Baltic Sea cannot be presented as a clear- cut optimistic narrative. 
Both the social and national boundaries of the post-communist world are blurred: 
distinctions between the dominant and the dominated, or the rich colonizer and the  
former colony cannot be easily established. The ideological priorities of the Soviet Union 
and the endemic economic inefficiency of the communist system led to the distortion of 
the relation between the parts of the empire and the centre. As a result, the population 
living on the peripheries of the empire often enjoyed a better life and more freedom than 
the majority of the dominant, Russian population. No wonder then, that the map of the 
former Soviet  empire does not conform to the clear-cut North-South divide characteristic 
of the Western European colonial legacy. It is equally difficult to establish how much of 
the former empire belongs to the “First World”, and how much to the “Third”, how much 
to Europe and how much to Asia. 
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     It will probably take time before  postcolonial scholarship adjusts its perspectives as a 
result of a thorough study of the post- Soviet world.  Doubtless, translation studies 
scholars will also benefit from the analysis of  communist and the post-communist 
translation in the framework of postcolonial studies. In the last few years  postcolonial 
theorists have developed a keen interest in translation, which should be viewed as a 
positive development, because both postcolonial theory and translation studies are 
interested in the nature of intercultural exchanges. Postcolonial theory as applied to 
translation has produced interesting debates about the relationships between “dominant” 
and “dominated” cultures, “major” and “minor” languages, and cases of cultural 
appropriation and textual adaptation.  Unfortunately, some of the ideological tangles of  
postcolonial theory have also been transplanted into translation studies, and the debate 
about translation in postcolonial context too often turns into a politically charged debate 
about economic inequalities. Let me quote a short passages from Richard Jaquemond 
which in my view is symptomatic of the marriage between postcolonial theory and 
translation: 
 
                 As a result of colonial and postcolonial history, inequality is the main feature  
                 of the relationship between Western and Third World languages and cultures,  
                 a fact which is bound to carry many implications for North-South translation  
                 processes.  Meanwhile, because translation theory (as well as literary theory 
                 in general) has developed on the almost exclusive basis of the European 
                 linguistic and cultural experience, it relies on the implicit postulate of 
                an egalitarian relationship between different linguistic and cultural areas 
                and has yet to integrate the recent results of the sociology of interculturality 
                in the colonial and postcolonial context. (Jaquemond 1992:140) 
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This densely written passage contains a number of generalizations  which  should not go 
unchallenged. First of all, the author attempts to marry scholarly research with politics, in 
talking about  linguistic inequality between “Western” and “Third World” languages and 
cultures and the inadequacy of European theories to deal with non-European problems. 
This is not the place to discuss the vast issue of equality of languages and cultures. What 
the author presumably means is not so much some essentialist inequality but probably 
power, which is attributed to widely used languages of global importance (e.g. English, 
French) while lack of power is associated with less widespread ones.  Yet at no point in 
history have languages been “equal” in relation to power. What is particularly 
disappointing in this passage is the attempt to politicize the issue by means of juxtaposing 
the West and the Third World and south and north. One may ask whether literatures 
written in such languages as Finnish, Czech, Hungarian, Irish or Basque (all of them 
northern) do not have the same problems in being translated as the languages of the Third 
World countries? The criticism of Eurocentrism in translation and literary theories is 
similarly problematic. It is not the fault of  theories conceived in Europe that they are, as 
Jaquemond says, ‘developed on the almost exclusive basis of the European linguistic and 
cultural experience’. It is natural that people who work in Europe should base their 
theories on the European context, which after all offers an astonishing variety of 
languages and cultures. 
     If the passage quoted above is a good example of how politicized postcolonial theory 
and translation studies may become, it should be easier to understand why the 
disintegrating Soviet empire has not been a welcome object of study for postcolonial 
theorists. However, if we look at the post-Soviet world as a case of a postcolonial 
development, we find a fascinating field of study. There are several factors which have 
had a profound influence on the way translation and cultural transfer have functioned in 
the imperial and post-imperial context in the East. First of all, the cultural policy of the 
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Soviet empire was a domain of the state, since Marxism perceived culture as a vital part 
of what was then called a social “superstructure”.  In practice, this meant that culture had 
to be controlled and planned in the same way as industrial or agricultural production was. 
However, the degree of state control over culture  fluctuated over time. The Soviet Union  
had more and less liberal periods in its history, and the “satellite” countries were given a 
certain degree of independence, or rather responsibility, for controlling their own cultural 
affairs. As a result, over several decades many parts of the empire evolved their own 
semi-independent models of cultural policy, and the difference between them could be 
measured by their tolerance for free expression and dissent. In some cases it led to 
conflicts, such as the Czech and East German anxieties about banned Czech and German 
writers being published in translation in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, or the Polish 
censors’ suspicion about a sudden enthusiasm of  publishers for Brecht’s antimilitarist 
poetry after the “Solidarity” movement was crushed in 1981.2
     The Soviet empire had also a highly structured language policy which went through 
several changes, and that aspect is also conspicuously different from the linguistic policy 
of France and Britain towards their colonies. For instance, in the 1920s Moscow 
encouraged the development of national languages and cultures as a vital part of the 
communist policy to integrate “nationalist form with socialist content”. That brief period, 
however, was followed by a consistent and prolonged period of outright russification. 
Combined with  massive deportations of whole ethnic groups under Stalin, it led to the 
establishment of the Russian language as the dominant one. The side effect of this 
process was what Homi Bhabha calls “hybridization”, except that in relation to the Soviet 
Union, it would be difficult to regard this phenomenon as “postmodern”. A high degree 
of hybridization had already existed in the Eastern and Central European borderlands due 
to the intense competition of the 19th C empires. Frequent shifts of borders and 
populations gave rise to complicated mixtures af languages and ethnicities. As a result in 
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the borderlands of Western Ukraine, Vojvodina, and Transylvania, many people living in 
rural areas still describe themselves as “locals” speaking a local dialect, and they resist 
the imposition of modern clear cut ethnicities and linguistic categories.3 The communist 
cultural policy, however, extended and deepened the process by means of rewriting and 
reshaping national histories and identities. Again, as in the case of censorship, the 
imperial policy depended on local circumstances. Although the satellite countries were 
allowed to retain their own languages as the official ones, and Russian was taught at 
school as the first foreign language, in the Soviet Union Russian was given a dominant 
position.  
    The position and role of translation was heavily influenced by the cultural and 
linguistic policies of the Soviet and “satellite” governments. Like other forms of social 
communication, translation was controlled by appropriate governmental bodies. Control  
was of  paramount importance for two reasons. First of all, it was through translation that 
their subjects could absorb the potentially subversive ideas from the outside. Secondly, 
translated texts could generate  intellectual debate within the empire, thus contributing to 
the creation of independent and unsupervised exchanges of opinion. This control over 
translation was carried out by state censorship agencies, which were responsible for the 
control of all printed texts, public performances, and the media. The system was of 
Byzantine proportions, and there were no explicit legal foundations for its functioning.  
In most cases the directives were meticulously prepared by  high officials of the 
Communist Party, and the public was not supposed to be aware of the fact that censorship 
was operating at all. The vast scale of the operation came to light only in the 1980s when 
the Polish government bowed to public pressure and agreed that all cases of  the censor’s 
interference had to be marked explicitly in the printed texts. For the first time, the 
previously invisible hand of the censor became conspicuous, and many  press articles 
looked like half edited texts, with missing parts of sentences or bracketed paragraphs.  
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     The significance of that change can be better understood only if we look at the more 
advanced forms of censorship the empire was trying to impose. The most desirable form 
was, of course, self censorship. It had already functioned well in the Soviet Union under 
Stalin, where government  appointed heads of publishing houses knew themselves what 
was not supposed to appear in print. Later on, the communist regimes in the “satellite” 
countries tried to install censorship as a joint responsibility. Writers, publishers, and 
translators were set clear limits of what was permitted, and it was their responsibility to 
make sure those limits were not overstepped. The Hungarian critic, Miklosz Haraszti, 
characterized this phenomenon in the following way: 
                    Censorship is no longer a matter of simple state intervention. A new 
aesthetic 
                    culture has emerged in which censors and artists alike are entangled 
                    in a mutual embrace. Nor is it as distasteful as traditional critics 
                    of censorship imagine. The state is able to domesticate  the artist because 
                    the artist has already made the state his home. (Haraszti 1989: 5) 
     What interests us here is how translation functioned under such circumstances. This is 
a complex issue, and it is difficult to offer her a general overview because the different 
policies were applied in different parts of the empire. My research is informed primarily 
by the Polish context, but compared to post-1968 Czechoslovakia, or East Germany, 
Poland was relatively liberal and it would be wrong to use the Polish case as an absolute 
standard. Perhaps the best way forward is to start with what was totally banned 
throughout the empire. Not unlike the Roman Catholic church, the communist regimes 
had their own Index of books which were not supposed to be either translated or 
distributed in the original language. Some of these books were classics, by writers such 
as Orwell, Solzhenitsyn, Milosz,  Kundera, Popper, and Hayek. The criteria for 
supression were chiefly ideological, but the Marxist puritanism  led also to the 
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disqualification of books which were considered “immoral”. Pornography was used as an 
umbrella category which covered cheap romance as well as V. Nabokov and  D.H. 
Lawrence, since the censors found it too complicated to deal with subtle distinctions 
between artistic represenations of sexuality and commercial exploitation of the human 
body. Western avant-garde authors were also viewed with suspicion. Changes in the 
political climate and international relations led to the alterations in the lists. For instance, 
the “thaw” following Stalin’s death in 1953 meant that many writers previously banned 
could be translated. In the late 1950s East Europeans were allowed to read Beckett, 
Ionesco, Sartre, and Camus. But the opening to the West did not coincide with the 
opening to the East. Although Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch 
was published officially in the Soviet Union in 1962, the regimes in the satellite countries 
preferred to keep revelations about the gulags out of the public view. 
     Apart from total bans, the censors  implemented other policies. The commonest form 
of censorship was the removal of  unacceptable passages from translated texts. Publishers 
were obliged to submit manuscripts to the censor’s office, and the adjustments  were 
made over the heads of translators. The reasons varied. A good example is the translation 
of Gunter Grass’s novel  The Tin Drum into Polish in 1980s. The pages the state censor 
decided to remove from the Polish translation described the Soviet army entering the city 
of Danzig in 1945. Grass portrayed the Soviets attempting to conquer the city because 
from his point of view they were the invaders. The censor removed the description, 
because the official position was that the Red Army never conquered, but always 
“liberated”. Because of Grass’s international reputation, the case was hotly disputed by 
the opposition intelligentsia, and gained quite a lot of semi-official publicity. Another 
strategy frequently deployed by the state was a restriction on the number of copies of 
books to be printed, or the distribution of books by means of subscription. Donald 
Rayfield describes how the process worked in the Soviet Union in relation to the pre-
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Revolutionary classics, but similar methods were used in relation to translated texts. 
(Rayfield 1994: 19-33)  Libraries which happened to stock foreign books on the index, 
had to place them in special, closed collections. In Poland they were called 
euphemistically ‘prohibita’. 
     If  foreign books were so well guarded, one might conclude that translation was a 
marginal activity in the Soviet empire. This was, however, not the case: even  in the 
darkest days of Stalinism translations did not cease to be published. In her remarkable 
memoir Hope Against Hope, Nadezhda Mandelstam gives an unexpected insight into the 
function of translation in the 1930s: 
                    At first we were materially better off in Voronezh than we had every been  
                    before. Impressed by the ‘miracle’, the State Publishing House gave us  
                    translation work. As my brother Evgeni put it, Moscow looked better after it  
                    burned down. I hastily translated some ghastly novel or other, and was  
                    immediately given a second contract. But in the winter of  1934-5  
                    the persons  responsible were evidently reprimanded for their kindness.  
                    I was summoned to Moscow for a talk about my ‘method of translation’.  
                    (Mandelstam 1975:162) 
From the 1930s to the very end of the Soviet empire, translation was to some extent a life 
line for the writers and dissidents banned from publishing their own work. In some cases 
the authorities tolerated this situation, but sometimes the contract had to be signed by a 
third person so there was no evidence that the persona non grata was commissioned  by a 
state publishing house to produce a translation. 
 
     In her memoir Mandelstam remarks that she was translating a ghastly novel entitled 
Nest of Simple Folk (Mandelstam 1975:163). That was by no means an unusual case. 
The Soviet and East European publishing houses were searching for specific categories 
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of texts to disseminate. First of all, the book had to be politically and ideologically 
acceptable. Another important factor was the cost of  copyright, since the autarchic 
communist economies were not willing to spend hard currency on translation rights. The 
only exceptions were writers of a left-wing and pro-Soviet persuasion. As a result, the 
Soviet world  built up a completely distorted view of Western literature: Steinbeck, 
London, and Dreiser were its most important American writers. But  Western literatures 
were not the only ones to be manipulated. All the non-Russian speaking provinces of the 
empire had to translate the classics of the Soviet era. Ideological factors  overrode the 
economic side of publishing, so the print runs of Marx and Lenin went into thousands of 
copies, although sales were minimal. Up to the end of the 1950s, many books were 
distributed either free or for very little money among  factory workers, to prove that there 
was a genuine demand for socialist realist literature. 
     Another type of book which was translated was what we tend to call the “world 
classic” - Shakespeare, Goethe, Mann, for example plus the “national” writers of various 
peoples incorporated into the Soviet Union. In the case of those “world classics”, the 
empire made sure that the publishers selected the least controversial texts for translation. 
A good example here is Dickens, whose Hard Times was published more often than his 
other novels. Drama, however, was more difficult to handle, particularly if the plays were 
to be staged in theatres. In Shakespeare Our Contemporary Jan Kott writes eloquently  
about the political significance of Shakespeare’s plays under communism. Indeed, live 
theatre was much more difficult to control than  printed texts, because control had to 
extend over the director’s interpretation of the text and the response of the audience. It is 
not surprising, then, that the censors not only read the scripts, but attended dress 
rehearsals. In some cases they even attended the first couple of shows to find out if  
viewers’ reactions indicated  some previously unnoticed  political allusions. And here, I 
think, we touch another crucial element of the communist control of translation - the 
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interpretation of a translated text. As if total control over cultural production were not 
sufficient, the Soviet empire aimed  at ensuring that even the interpretation of  literary 
texts went along official lines. This was achieved through the system of education, which 
was as closely controlled as all the cultural activities. It was here, in the classroom, that 
the empire supplied the correct interpretation of texts from Aristotle to Gorky and that 
learners were rewarded for the faithful reproduction of what they read in government 
approved textbooks. No wonder, then, that “world classics” did not pose an interpretive 
threat to the established opinions.4
     With so much energy going into the production of desirable texts, there was a large 
number of people taking part in the process of translating and interpretation. The 
ideological “transmission belt” for disseminating ideologically approved ideas,  had well 
defined institutional forms, like writers’ and translators’ unions, publishers’ associations, 
literary critics, and thousands of teachers. Not all of them were committed to the cause, 
though some believed that a “faithful” translation of a literary text was more important 
than all these external factors, and made political conformism worthwhile. 
     The power relation between the colonizers and the subjugated people is at the centre 
of postcolonial criticism. The starting point for theorizing, as it has been done to date, is 
the assumption that the colonizing power deliberately creates a notion of  cultural 
inequality between the colonizer and the colonized. The colonizers are civilized, while 
the colonized are primitive. This categorization  extends to culture and language. As a 
result, de-colonization is viewed as project which aims at demolishing this construct and 
redressing the unequal balance. Although this model can be successfully applied to the 
relation between some European empires and their overseas colonies, it is of much less 
use in the Soviet context. First of all, the official discourse of the Soviet empire denied 
the existence of any colonial relationship. The principle of equality and the brotherhood 
of nations masked the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
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propaganda achieved a considerable success in representating communism as an ideology 
of liberation. Annexation of new territories was always represented as a justfied attempt 
to free “the people” from the imperialist domination. Behind the skillful rhetoric, terror 
and repression were used as the instruments of government both in relation to the 
imperial nation, the Russians, and the colonized people.5 In fact, the number of Russians 
who lost their lives at the hand of  “red commissars” may be as high as the losses in non-
Russian parts of the empire, and Russian culture was subject to the same harsh measures 
as other cultures remaining in the Soviet sphere of influence. 
     Since both the empire and its colonies had to be constantly supervised, the method  
the Soviets found most useful was the old principle of “divide and conquer”. This 
principle was used by the French and the British  as well, but the sheer linguistic and 
cultural variety of the Soviet empire gave a greater scope for manipulation which 
sometimes took drastic form, such as the dissemination of negative stereotypes, or the 
revival of old prejudices. As far as translation policies were concerned, the Soviets 
introduced a tacit rule that a book written in  a language other than Russian had to be 
translated into Russian before it could be translated into other languages, since a direct 
contact of minority cultures with the West could lead to independent cultural initiatives. 
Gradually the Russian language became an instrument of control over non-Russian 
language texts. This policy coupled with the enforcement of Russian as the language of 
education, created a situation in which, for instance, many educated Ukrainians or Azeris 
preferred to read their national writers in translation rather than in the original. The 
powerful position which the Russian language was given in the empire encouraged some 
writers to abandon their native languages, since the use of a local language meant a 
limited readership and  difficulty in being translated into other languages.  
     The power relations within an empire lead naturally to the question of resistance. This 
issue has received a lot of attention from postcolonial critics. In translation studies, the 
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question of resistance has been discussed in the context of India by  Niranjana Tejaswini, 
and Elsa Veira discussed this issue in the context of the colonial relations of Europe to 
Latin America. There is no doubt that some of the models are applicable to the Soviet 
context, especially in the period following the collapse of the Soviet empire.  However, 
there are significant differences between Western domination and the Soviet empire. The 
first difference concerns the language policy. The British or Portuguese imposition of 
their language on their respective colonies was much more effective than anything the 
Russians and Soviets managed to achieve, mainly because  of the length of the colonial 
domination. While Portuguese  became the national language in Brazil, and the position 
of English in India is still of considerable significance, Russian domination in many parts 
of the empire simply did not last long enough to eradicate the indigenous cultures and 
languages. This allowed subjugated nations to preserve their languages, which served as 
a shield against  total cultural domination. In countries like Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia the cultivation of the local language was a major form of resistance. This 
also meant that these nations  put as much effort as they could into publishing in their 
own languages. In the “satellite” countries, where the national languages were the official 
language of education, linguistic resistance was not as relevant. Thus the response to the 
Soviet language policy produced many forms of resistance, and many forms of linguistic 
hybridity. Without  systematic case studies it would be premature to guess which of the 
models of cultural resistance in the West may have parallels in the post-Soviet context.   
     However, it would be a  mistake to claim that the imposition of the Russian language 
and  culture was the main aim of the Soviet empire. Had that been the case, Moscow 
would have ordered each village in the empire to have a Russian banya (communal bath), 
in the same way that the British ordered the building of public libraries. As we know, 
however, the symbol of the Soviet presence was not a banya but an ugly building called 
“a palace of culture”, because the empire’s main aim was to organize the whole empire 
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along the same ideological lines. This meant, in the first place, the disruption of locally-
developed social bonds, the imposition of new concepts of ownership, and the insistence 
that collective norms had a precedence over individual rights. As Czeslaw Milosz 
explained in The Captive Mind,  communism was a phenomenon that stood in  total 
opposition to the traditional ways of European societies. Because the change was so 
radical,  the empire had to apply the most extraordinary measures to prevent any form of 
resistance, since resistance in itself was a phenomenon which belonged to the “old”, pre- 
Soviet world, and as such had no right to exist under communism. The story of resistance 
in the Soviet empire is a very complex one, but perhaps the most important thing we have 
learnt from it is that the very existence of an empire generates resistance and that no 
measure of terror can suppress the urge to think independently. 
     Cultural resistance took different forms, and its intensity and effectiveness depended 
on local traditions and circumstances.  In some “satellite” countries, like Poland, 
underground publishing had a  tradition centuries long, and in the 1980s it became a vital 
part of  Polish civil society. Equally important  for keeping independent thought alive in 
Russia was samizdat, and Charter 77 played a similar role in Czechoslovakia. All these 
initiatives were very much helped by emigre organizations which set up publishing 
ventures in Western Europe and North America.6
     Translation, of course, was a vital part of cultural resistance. The initial aim of many 
unofficial ventures was to translate and distribute precisely those Western texts the 
communist system did not tolerate. George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm were 
perhaps the icons of that period, but the clandestine publishers managed to disseminate 
an impressive number of titles including fiction, philosophical works, and texts from 
social studies and economics. But translation also meant the transfer and circulation of 
works written by authors living within the empire’s borders. For instance, from the Polish 
Antologia wolnej literatury rosyjskiej (Anthology of Free Russian Literature) we learn 
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that in the 1970s and 1980s  the works of more than twenty Russian writers banned in the 
Soviet Union were published by Polish clandestine presses. In the same way, the 
Russians and Czechs tried to keep in touch with banned Polish writing . The cultural 
effect of these undertakings  was very visible. In official and semi-official publication 
allusions were made to texts which were available only from clandestine presses. 
Gradually, even the official critical discourse tacitly acknowledged the fact that there was 
a vast body of texts and ideas which was not legally recognized and as such had no right 
to exist, yet which circulated and were widely known. 
     Thus translation eventually contributed to the establishment of a public discourse 
which  functioned quite independently of the discourse controlled by the empire. It would 
be difficult to prove that  the civil society created in some parts of the Soviet empire had 
a direct impact on the later transition from totalitarianism to economic and social 
emancipation in Eastern Europe. However, if we contrast countries like Hungary, Poland, 
and the Czech Republic with East Germany,  we may well ask why East German 
economic and cultural transition has been so much less effective, despite the fact that the 
East Germans had  easy access to Western models via West German television, and have 
been showered with financial hand outs since 1990. Perhaps the difference is that by 
constructing a civil society even on a small scale, the former countries painstakingly 
learned  the rules which would apply after the empire’s demise, while those who merely 
watched the Western world did not have a chance to develop appropriate habits. 
     This last observation brings us to the most recent, and perhaps the most truly 
postcolonial phase of the Soviet empire. Popular representations of Eastern Europe since 
1989 have created an impression that all parts of the post Soviet world are similar, and 
the wars in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus have given rise to a  claim that the break up of 
the Soviet Union inevitably means the rise of nationalism. The fact that most of the 
former parts of the empire have managed to handle the issues of nationalism well so far 
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has remained sadly unnoticed. Perhaps the economists were best prepared to come to 
terms with the logical fact that the disintegration of  such a vast and culturally diverse 
empire was bound to create more diversity than similarity. It is the economic perspective 
which helps to make sense of what has happened to publishing and translation in the post 
-Soviet world, or at least in Central Europe and in Russia itself. First of all, with the 
disappearance of  state censorship and the state monopoly in publishing, the whole 
publishing world went through a period of  dramatic change. A myriad of small 
publishing companies filled the gap left by bankrupt state publishers. The opening up of 
the economies allowed  publishers to negotiate copyrights with foreign publishers, but 
the acute shortage of funds meant that  immediate profit meant more to the publishers 
more than the quality of what was translated and published. This economic liberalism 
coincided with a profound social change. The state relinquished its right to shape and 
control  readers’ tastes, and what readers wanted to read were books previously banned 
and disapproved.  In practice this meant that from 1990 to approximately 1995,  Eastern 
Europe witnessed the unprecedented popularity of  Anglo-American pulp fiction 
translated very badly and at great speed by cash-strapped students of English. Many 
members of the intelligentsia and some previously sympathetic overseas commentators 
did not conceal their deep disappointment at what was happening. Yesterday’s 
revolutionaries turned into consumers of fast food and cheap paperbacks, which in 
Poland are covered by a common name ludlums, coined from the surname of a prolific 
British author of popular fiction. Since 1995, however, the market has again changed. 
Quality publishing has made a  comeback, and the reading public has begun to diversify 
along the same lines as elsewhere in Europe. 
     But this general trend does not tell the whole story of  the change translation has 
undergone in the post- Soviet world. The transition to models similar to Western ones is 
characteristic of those parts of the empire which  managed to retain their own languages 
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and pre-Soviet cultural characteristics. For these countries, which include the whole of 
Central Europe, the Baltic States and some other parts of the former Soviet Union, the 
transition to modernity has been a matter of  recovering the more useful elements of the 
pre-Soviet past and adapting them to  post-communist context. This also includes the 
rediscovery of the cultural and linguistic diversity of their regions, which the Soviets 
disguised by imposing the class-based Marxist model.  But the demise of the Soviet 
empire has left a number of  communities for whom a recovery of their communal 
memory and historical roots is much more difficult than in the countries mentioned 
above. The intensive sovietization and russification of some areas of the empire have 
created problems comparable to those with which the former French or British colonies 
have had to come to terms.  In all these cases translation may play an important role in 
the formation  of a future cultural identity, although it is too early to say whether there is 
going to be any consistency in the way translation operates as a cultural force. So at this 
early stage of  postcolonial and post-Soviet development one can only examine only  
particular case studies and hoping that a sufficient number of such studies will lead to 
fruitful generalization. 
     The first case study comes from Azerbaijan,  a country which for a long time 
remained under pressure from its more powerful neighburs: Russia and Iran. In 1991, 
following the break up with the Soviet Union, the Azeri State Publishing House 
published the collected works of Nizami of  Ganja, a twelfth-century poet who is 
regarded as one of the most important of all Persian poets.7 The Azerbaijan editors of  
Nizami’s poetry themselves claim that this is a major edition of their national poet. But 
the edition is a translalation of the original poem  into Russian, and the original text 
written in Pharsi is not included. The extensive introduction to the translation does not 
mention this paradox, as it fails to mention anything else about the process of translating. 
In contemporary translation studies, there is a strong tendency to view such cases as 
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either “manipulation” or “rewriting”, but a closer look at Azerbaijan’s complex cultural 
and linguistic heritage shows that this theoretical framework, though useful, may be not 
sufficient. 
 After over a hundred years of Russian and Soviet domination the Azeris were anxious to 
establish themselves as an independent nation.8 During the long period of colonization 
the Russians succeeded in marginalizing the Azeri language to the point that it has been 
reduced to the language of uneducated masses. Being a Turkic language, Azeri was 
written in Arabic script until Russia ordered the replacemnt of Arabic with Cyrillic. In 
the early 1990s the country debated about going back to Arabic, or following the Turkish 
language reform and accepting Latin script. The supporters of the Turkish style reform 
were in a majority, and as a result now Azeris use Latin script. However, Russian still 
remains the language of the educated stratum of  Azeri society, and it will take time 
before Azeri language begins to function at all levels of communication.9 If the aim of 
the editors of Nizami’s poetry was to establish his reputation as a national poet, then they 
had to convey the idea in the language used by the cultural elite. i.e. in Russian. It is very 
likely that a new edition in Pharsi will follow, but for a time being the Azeri national poet 
will be read in Russian. 
 A second case study comes from Belarus, at the other end of the Soviet empire. One of 
the most important cultural events since the end of the Soviet Union has been the 
publication of James Joyce’s Ulysses in a translation by Jan Maksymiuk, who lives in 
Poland.10 Maksymiuk’s spoken language is Belorussian, the language in which he 
learned to write was Old Church Slavonic. He began to Learn Polish only at the age of 
seven when he went to the state school.  When Maksymiuk sent the first nine episodes of 
his Belarussian Ulysses to the academics in Minsk, he caused a sensation. First of all, a 
Russian translation of the book did not yet exist-it was published in 1993. Secondly, in a 
country where polonization- and more recently and more decisively, russification-have 
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relegated Belarussian to the status of a language used principally by rural communities, 
the appearance of Joyce’s work in Belarussian bordered on the miraculous. The political 
and cultural situation in Belarus is so fragile that it is impossible to make any predictions 
of the results. Some hope that the country will go through a cultural revival, similar to o 
the  the Czechs revival of the early nineteenth century. Others are deeply pessimistic, and 
see the present political alliance of the country with Russia as the end of Belarussian 
cultural and political identity. The only place where the Belarussian language and culture 
remain alive is North-Eastern Poland, where Maksymiuk lives, but the language of that 
community could not cope with the universe of Joyce’s work. Therefore, the translation 
of Ulysses into Belarussian was more than a simple literary translation; it was an attempt 
to recover the potential which the Belarussian language has lost. Maksymiuk describes 
the process in the following way: 
                   I  used old dictionaries of Belarussian dialect in order to be able to find 
                  credible equivalents for neologisms  used by Joyce, and for the same reason 
                   I was screening many fifteenth  century and other old Belarussianan    
                  documents. When there was no equivalent, I was either inventing one or 
                  creating a word out of  several existing ones  in different dialects. When I  
                  came across useful words that had been forgotten,  I tried to bring them back  
                  to modern   usage, and these  new words could be used instead of recent  
                  Russian borrowings. My knowledge of  Church Slavonic came in very useful,  
                  and so did  the knowledge of the old Belarussian. 
                    (Niczyporowicz 1997:  79)11 
For Maksymiuk this translation is entirely a personal affair : ‘For Joyce it was important 
to be able to write in English, the language of  the occupying country, because he did not 
have Irish. For me it was important that Belarussian culture and language created a 
unique opportunity for me’. (Niczyporowicz 1997: 79) Obviously, once the translated 
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text is printed, the translator loses control over its function, and we have still to see what 
is the significance of Ulysses for Belarus. However, the fact that the Belorussian cultural 
elites have now a proof that the Belorussian language is capable of mediating such a 
complicated modernist text as Ulysses, may help them to strengthen their belief in the 
possibility of a linguistic and cultural revival.  
     These two recent instances of postcolonial translation in the post-Soviet world suggest  
that despite substantial differences between the cultural histories of different empires, it 
is possible to uncover certain parallels between the role of translation in postcolonial 
worlds. But it would be premature to assume that there are more parallels than 
differences. The fact that the buoyant development of postcolonial studies in the last 
decades has mainly been in Europe and North America suggests that an appropriate 
temporal distance helps to sharpen the critical faculties. The end of the Soviet empire has 
created a new postcolonial space, which remains unpredictable and unexplored. The fact 
that in the East colonialism was coupled with communism, makes the process of 
decolonization much more complex than it was the case in the West. The linguistic 
diversity of the former empire poses an additional difficulty for postcolonial studies, 
which have developed on the comfortable assumption that empires leave behind a vast 
space dominated by one colonial language, and that the former colonies strive to 
challenge this linguistic legacy. It remains to be seen whether translation studies in 
association with the postcolonial theory will rise to this multicultural challenge.12
 
 
                                       
                                                        Notes 
                                                          
1 Czeslaw Milosz’s The Captive Mind still remains the best account of how the intellectuals collaborated 
with the communists in Eastern Europe in 1940s and 1950s. The account of the Western fascination with 
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communism can be found in David Caute’s The Fellow Travellers. New Haven:Yale University Press, 
1988 (revised edition). 
2  Only very recently, the state archives in Eastern Europe have been made avaialble to the researchers, and 
a full account of the censorship in the Soviet empire is yet to be written. A partial account can be found in 
Herman Ermolaev’s Censorship in Russia 1917-1991. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996. 
3 A good account of this phenomenon can be found in Anne Applebaum’s Between East and West. 
New York:Pantheon Books, 1994. 
4 Felicity Rosslyn’s article ‘Dulness and General Jaruzelski’, The Cambridge Quarterly 2 (1987):95-110 
contains a good analysis of liberal education under communism. 
5 Good insights into the totalitarian control over the use of language can be found in John Wesley Young’s 
comparative study of language control in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union Totalitarian Language. The 
University Press of Virginia, 1991.  
 
 
 
6 Debates about “socialism with a human face” and “the third way” were very much alive within the 
communist and socialist parties in Eastren and Western Europe in 1970s and 1980s. Even more liberal left 
in the West suggested that the resistance in the East was directed only against the distortions of the Marxist 
ideas, and not against Marxism and communism itself. The revolutions of 1989 and 1990 showed that for a 
majority of population in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the distinction was irrelevant. For all 
Central European countries and for many Soviet republics, the removal of communism was synonymous 
with the removal of the occupying Red Army.  
7 In 1996 Oxford University Press published Nizami’s romance Haft Paykar in Julie Meisami’s translation. 
The poet is introduced as a Persian author, and this seems to be a prevailing view outside Azarbaijan. 
However, in the preface to the Azeri edition, R.M Aliiev is strongly arguing against this view. It is up to 
specialists in Turkic and Persian literatures to assess this revisionist critique.  
 
 
  
8 It seems that the strong nationalist tendency was at the bottom of the territorial dispute and the subsequent 
war with Armenia in the early 1990s. 
 
9 Several Azeri academics were suggesting to me in 1992 that the best solution for Azerbaijan would be to 
adopt English as a national language, and they were convinced then that the US presence would increase 
considerably in the region. So far half of this prophecy has been confirmed: the United States have invested 
heavily in the Caspian oil fields, and the American presence in this small country is very conspicuous. 
 
10 Despite enormous populations shifts after 1945, Poland retained a small but active Belarussian minority 
concentrated in North East Poland. An interesting account of the language issues in Belarus can be found 
in Sven Gustavsson, ‘Belarus: A Multilingual State in Eastern Europe’, Uppsala Multiethnic Papers 34 
(1994/5). 39-75. 
 
11 This and subsequent translations from Polish are mine. 
12 The new volume of essays on postcolonial translation Postcolonial Translation. Theory and Practice. Ed. 
S. Bassnett and H. Trivedi. London: Routledge, 1999 completely ignores the post-communist world as a 
postcolonial space, which shows that the the mental adjustment of many academics working in this field 
may take longer than the economic transformation of eastern Europe. 
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